FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   286   287   288   289   290   291   292   293   294   295   296   297   298   299   300   301   302   303   304   305   306   307   308   309   310  
311   312   313   314   315   316   317   318   319   320   321   322   323   324   325   326   327   328   329   330   331   332   333   334   335   >>   >|  
Brahe's accurate observations; and it was only after some progress in physical and chemical science that the improved instruments with which those observations were made, became possible. The heliocentric theory of the solar system had to wait until the invention of the telescope before it could be finally established. Nay, even the grand discovery of all--the law of gravitation--depended for its proof upon an operation of physical science, the measurement of a degree on the Earth's surface. So completely indeed did it thus depend, that Newton _had actually abandoned his hypothesis_ because the length of a degree, as then stated, brought out wrong results; and it was only after Picart's more exact measurement was published, that he returned to his calculations and proved his great generalisation. Now this constant intercommunion, which, for brevity's sake, we have illustrated in the case of one science only, has been taking place with all the sciences. Throughout the whole course of their evolution there has been a continuous _consensus_ of the sciences--a _consensus_ exhibiting a general correspondence with the _consensus_ of faculties in each phase of mental development; the one being an objective registry of the subjective state of the other. From our present point of view, then, it becomes obvious that the conception of a _serial_ arrangement of the sciences is a vicious one. It is not simply that the schemes we have examined are untenable; but it is that the sciences cannot be rightly placed in any linear order whatever. It is not simply that, as M. Comte admits, a classification "will always involve something, if not arbitrary, at least artificial;" it is not, as he would have us believe, that, neglecting minor imperfections a classification may be substantially true; but it is that any grouping of the sciences in a succession gives a radically erroneous idea of their genesis and their dependencies. There is no "one _rational_ order among a host of possible systems." There is no "true _filiation_ of the sciences." The whole hypothesis is fundamentally false. Indeed, it needs but a glance at its origin to see at once how baseless it is. Why a _series_? What reason have we to suppose that the sciences admit of a _linear_ arrangement? Where is our warrant for assuming that there is some _succession_ in which they can be placed? There is no reason; no warrant. Whence then has arisen the supposition? To use M. Comte's
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   286   287   288   289   290   291   292   293   294   295   296   297   298   299   300   301   302   303   304   305   306   307   308   309   310  
311   312   313   314   315   316   317   318   319   320   321   322   323   324   325   326   327   328   329   330   331   332   333   334   335   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

sciences

 

consensus

 
science
 

measurement

 
physical
 

degree

 

hypothesis

 
classification
 

observations

 

succession


linear

 

warrant

 

reason

 
simply
 

arrangement

 

admits

 
present
 

vicious

 

involve

 

conception


rightly
 

untenable

 
arbitrary
 
schemes
 

serial

 
examined
 

obvious

 

erroneous

 

baseless

 

series


glance

 

origin

 

suppose

 
arisen
 

supposition

 

Whence

 

assuming

 

Indeed

 

imperfections

 

substantially


grouping

 

neglecting

 
artificial
 

radically

 

systems

 

filiation

 

fundamentally

 

rational

 

genesis

 
dependencies