political associates, that the right of
a State to secede was unquestionable, I differed from most of them as to
the probability of our being permitted peaceably to exercise the right.
The knowledge acquired by the administration of the War Department for
four years, and by the chairmanship of the Military Committee of the
Senate at two different periods, still longer in combined duration, had
shown me the entire lack of preparation for war in the South. The
foundries and armories were in the Northern States, and there were
stored all the new and improved weapons of war. In the arsenals of the
Southern States were to be found only arms of the old and rejected
models. The South had no manufactories of powder, and no navy to protect
our harbors, no merchant-ships for foreign commerce. It was evident to
me, therefore, that, if we should be involved in war, the odds against
us would be far greater than what was due merely to our inferiority in
population. Believing that secession would be the precursor of war
between the States, I was consequently slower and more reluctant than
others, who entertained a different opinion, to resort to that remedy.

While engaged in the consultation with the Governor just referred to, a
telegraphic message was handed to me from two members of Mr. Buchanan's
Cabinet, urging me to proceed "immediately" to Washington. This dispatch
was laid before the Governor and the members of Congress from the State
who were in conference with him, and it was decided that I should comply
with the summons. I was afterward informed that my associates considered
me "too slow," and they were probably correct in the belief that I was
behind the general opinion of the people of the State as to the
propriety of prompt secession.[19]

On arrival at Washington, I found, as had been anticipated, that my
presence there was desired on account of the influence which it was
supposed I might exercise with the President (Mr. Buchanan) in relation
to his forthcoming message to Congress. On paying my respects to the
President, he told me that he had finished the rough draft of his
message, but that it was still open to revision and amendment, and that
he would like to read it to me. He did so, and very kindly accepted all
the modifications which I suggested. The message was, however, afterward
somewhat changed, and, with great deference to the wisdom and
statesmanship of its author, I must say that, in my judgment, the last