The grammar of any particular language,
_applies_ those common principles to that particular language.' And yet,
with _this clear truth_ before his eyes, he boldly proceeds to give a
_particular_ grammar; without being himself possessed of one single
principle of universal grammar."--_Diversions of Purley_, Vol. 1, p. 224.
If Dr. Lowth discredited his better judgement in attempting to write an
English grammar, perhaps Murray, and his weaker copyists, have little
honoured theirs, in supposing they were adequate to such a work. But I do
not admit, that either Lowth or Murray "_begins most judiciously_," in
speaking of Universal and Particular grammar in the manner above cited. The
authors who have started with this fundamental blunder, are strangely
numerous. It is found in some of the most dissimilar systems that can be
named. Even Oliver B. Peirce, who has a much lower opinion of Murray's
ability in grammar than Tooke had of Lowth's, adopts this false notion with
all implicitness, though he decks it in language more objectionable, and
scorns to acknowledge whence he got it. See his _Gram._, p. 16. De Suey, in
his Principles of General Grammar, says, "All rules of Syntax relate to two
things, _Agreement and Government_."--_Foxdick's Tr._, p. 108. And again:
"None of these rules properly belong to General Grammar, as each language
follows, in regard to the rules of Agreement and Government, a course
peculiar to itself."--_Ibid._, p. 109." "It is with Construction [i.e.,
Arrangement] as with Syntax. It follows no general rule common to all
languages."--_Ibid._ According to these positions, which I do not admit to
be strictly true, General or Universal Grammar has no principles of
_Syntax_ at all, whatever else it may have which Particular Grammar can
assume and apply.

[3] This verb "_do_" is wrong, because "_to be contemned_" is passive.

[4] "A very good judge has left us his opinion and determination in this
matter; that he 'would take for his rule in speaking, not what might happen
to be the faulty caprice of the multitude, but the consent and agreement of
learned men.'"--_Creighton's Dict._, p. 21. The "good judge" here spoken
of, is Quintilian; whose words on the point are these: "Necessarium est
judicium, constituendumque imprimis, id ipsum quid sit, quod
_consuetudinem_ vocemus. * * * In loquendo, non, si quid vitiose multis
insederit, pro regula sermonis, amplendum est. * * * Ergo consuetudinem
sermonis, vocabo _