who
contend that names were made by chance, are no less audacious than if they
would endeavour to persuade us, that the whole order of the universe was
framed together fortuitously."

20. "You will see," continues he, "that in the first language, whatever it
was, the names of things were taken from Nature herself; but, though I
cannot affirm this to have been the case in other tongues, yet I can easily
persuade myself that in every tongue a reason can be rendered for the
application of every name; and that this reason, though it is in many cases
obscure, is nevertheless worthy of investigation. Many things which were
not known to the earlier philosophers, were brought to light by Plato;
after the death of Plato, many were discovered by Aristotle; and Aristotle
was ignorant of many which are now everywhere known. For truth lies hid,
but nothing is more precious than truth. But you will say, 'How can there
be any certain origin to names, when one and the same thing is called by
different names, in the several parts of the world?' I answer, of the same
thing there may be different causes, of which some people may regard one,
and others, an other. * * * There is therefore no doubt, that of all
things, even of words, a reason is to be rendered: and if we know not what
that reason is, when we are asked; we ought rather to confess that we do
not know, than to affirm that none can be given. I know that Scaliger
thinks otherwise; but this is the true account of the matter."

21. "These several observations," he remarks further, "I have unwillingly
brought together against those stubborn critics who, while they explode
reason from grammar, insist so much on the testimonies of the learned. But
have they never read Quintilian, who says, (Lib. i, Cap. 6,) that,
'Language is established by reason, antiquity, authority, and custom?' He
therefore does not exclude reason, but makes it the principal thing. Nay,
in a manner, Laurentius, and other grammatists, even of their fooleries,
are forward to offer _reasons_, such as they are. Moreover, use does not
take place without reason; otherwise, it ought to be called abuse, and not
use. But from use authority derives all its force; for when it recedes from
use, authority becomes nothing: whence Cicero reproves Coelius and Marcus
Antonius for speaking according to their own fancy, and not according to
use. But, 'Nothing can be lasting,' says Curtius, (Lib. iv,) 'which is not
based upon reaso