f grammar, the _nature of the ideas_ conveyed by casual examples,
is not very essential: to the learner, it is highly important. The best
thoughts in the best diction should furnish the models for youthful study
and imitation; because such language is not only the most worthy to be
remembered, but the most easy to be understood. A distinction is also to be
made between use and abuse. In nonsense, absurdity, or falsehood, there can
never be any grammatical authority; because, however language may be
abused, the usage which gives law to speech, is still that usage which is
founded upon the _common sense_ of mankind.

18. Grammar appeals to reason, as well as to authority, but to what extent
it should do so, has been matter of dispute. "The knowledge of useful
arts," says Sanctius, "is not an invention of human ingenuity, but an
emanation from the Deity, descending from above for the use of man, as
Minerva sprung from the brain of Jupiter. Wherefore, unless thou give
thyself wholly to laborious research into the nature of things, and
diligently examine the _causes and reasons_ of the art thou teachest,
believe me, thou shalt but see with other men's eyes, and hear with other
men's ears. But the minds of many are preoccupied with a certain perverse
opinion, or rather ignorant conceit, that in grammar, or the art of
speaking, there are no causes, and that reason is scarcely to be appealed
to for any thing;--than which idle notion, I know of nothing more
foolish;--nothing can be thought of which is more offensive. Shall man,
endowed with reason, do, say, or contrive any thing, without design, and
without understanding? Hear the philosophers; who positively declare that
nothing comes to pass without a cause. Hear Plato himself; who affirms that
names and words subsist by nature, and contends that language is derived
from nature, and not from art."

19. "I know," says he, "that the Aristotelians think otherwise; but no one
will doubt that names are the signs, and as it were the instruments, of
things. But the instrument of any art is so adapted to that art, that for
any other purpose it must seem unfit; thus with an auger we bore, and with
a saw we cut wood; but we split stones with wedges, and wedges are driven
with heavy mauls. We cannot therefore but believe that those who first gave
names to things, did it with design; and this, I imagine, Aristotle himself
understood when he said, _ad placitum nomina significare._ For those