potic Government, yet none of us would wish that the agency of
England should be gratuitously and wantonly employed in extending the
limits of that despotism, and causing it to exercise its power where
that power had not before prevailed. In truth, as you know, the case
is even more gross than I have supposed it, because the most important
case of this extension was that in which a portion of Bessarabia was
handed back to Russia. That portion of Bessarabia had been under free
institutions--perfectly free representative institutions. It was
handed back to Russia, and placed under despotic institutions, and it
was so handed back under an arrangement made between Lord Salisbury,
the Minister of England, and Count Schouvaloff, the Minister of
Russia. They agreed beforehand that this should be done at the
Congress at Berlin, with this reservation--Lord Salisbury said,
'Unless I convince you by my argument that you ought not to do it.'
You may attach what value you please to the reservation, but I think I
can illustrate without much difficulty the effect of that promise made
beforehand. You remember, perhaps, that in the year 1871 the Russians
demanded that the Treaty of Paris should be altered, and that the
restriction should be removed upon their right to build ships in the
Black Sea. The whole of the Powers of Europe met in London by their
representatives, and they agreed to that change, and the charge,
gentlemen, has been laid upon the British Government of having made
that change; and not only so, but I read in one of the blue placards
this morning that Mr. Gladstone removed the restriction from the
Emperor of Russia. Now I repel that charge. What we did was--we
considered the matter with the other Powers of Europe; we required
Russia to admit that she had no power to make the change except with
the consent of the other Powers. The other Powers could not deny that
the change was in itself not unreasonable, and so the change was made.
But I want to know what people would have said, supposing, in
the middle of these deliberations, somebody had produced a
Salisbury-Schouvaloff agreement. Supposing he had produced a
memorandum signed by Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary of England,
and Count Brunow, the ambassador of Russia, and supposing in that
memorandum Lord Granville had, before the meeting of Europe in
congress, pledged himself to give this concession to Russia unless he
could convince the Russians by his argument,
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