why
such a system of thought must be received under that denomination, and
such another rejected. It is only by taste we can decide concerning
it, nor are we possest of any other standard, upon which we can form a
judgment of this kind. Now what is this taste, from which true and false
wit in a manner receive their being, and without which no thought can
have a title to either of these denominations? It is plainly nothing
but a sensation of pleasure from true wit, and of uneasiness from
false, without oar being able to tell the reasons of that pleasure
or uneasiness. The power of bestowing these opposite sensations is.
therefore, the very essence of true and false wit; and consequently the
cause of that pride or humility, which arises from them.

There may, perhaps, be some, who being accustomed to the style of the
schools and pulpit, and having never considered human nature in any
other light, than that in which they place it, may here be surprized
to hear me talk of virtue as exciting pride, which they look upon as a
vice; and of vice as producing humility, which they have been taught to
consider as a virtue. But not to dispute about words, I observe, that by
pride I understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind,
when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or power makes us
satisfyed with ourselves: and that by humility I mean the opposite
impression. It is evident the former impression is not always vicious,
nor the latter virtuous. The most rigid morality allows us to receive
a pleasure from reflecting on a generous action; and it is by none
esteemed a virtue to feel any fruitless remorses upon the thoughts
of past villainy and baseness. Let us, therefore, examine these
impressions, considered in themselves; and enquire into their causes,
whether placed on the mind or body, without troubling ourselves at
present with that merit or blame, which may attend them.

SECT. VIII OF BEAUTY AND DEFORMITY

Whether we consider the body as a part of ourselves, or assent to those
philosophers, who regard it as something external, it must still be
allowed to be near enough connected with us to form one of these double
relations, which I have asserted to be necessary to the causes of pride
and humility. Wherever, therefore, we can find the other relation of
impressions to join to this of ideas, we may expect with assurance
either of these passions, according as the impression is pleasant
or unea