the passions
of pride and humility. The very essence of virtue, according to this
hypothesis, is to produce pleasure and that of vice to give pain. The
virtue and vice must be part of our character in order to excite pride
or humility. What farther proof can we desire for the double relation of
impressions and ideas?
The same unquestionable argument may be derived from the opinion of
those, who maintain that morality is something real, essential, and
founded on nature. The most probable hypothesis, which has been advanced
to explain the distinction betwixt vice and virtue, and the origin of
moral rights and obligations, is, that from a primary constitution
of nature certain characters and passions, by the very view and
contemplation, produce a pain, and others in like manner excite a
pleasure. The uneasiness and satisfaction are not only inseparable
from vice and virtue, but constitute their very nature and essence.
To approve of a character is to feel an original delight upon its
appearance. To disapprove of it is to be sensible of an uneasiness.
The pain and pleasure, therefore, being the primary causes of vice and
virtue, must also be the causes of all their effects, and consequently
of pride and humility, which are the unavoidable attendants of that
distinction.
But supposing this hypothesis of moral philosophy should be allowed to
be false, it is still evident, that pain and pleasure, if not the causes
of vice and virtue, are at least inseparable from them. A generous and
noble character affords a satisfaction even in the survey; and when
presented to us, though only in a poem or fable, never fails to charm
and delight us. On the other hand cruelty and treachery displease from
their very nature; nor is it possible ever to reconcile us to these
qualities, either in ourselves or others. Thus one hypothesis of
morality is an undeniable proof of the foregoing system, and the other
at worst agrees with it. But pride and humility arise not from these
qualities alone of the mind, which, according to the vulgar systems of
ethicks, have been comprehended as parts of moral duty, but from
any other that has a connexion with pleasure and uneasiness. Nothing
flatters our vanity more than the talent of pleasing by our wit,
good humour, or any other accomplishment; and nothing gives us a more
sensible mortification than a disappointment in any attempt of that
nature. No one has ever been able to tell what wit is, and to-shew
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