indulged a reverie in my chamber, or in a solitary walk by a
river-side, I feel my mind all collected within itself, and am naturally
inclined to carry my view into all those subjects, about which I have
met with so many disputes in the course of my reading and conversation.
I cannot forbear having a curiosity to be acquainted with the principles
of moral good and evil, the nature and foundation of government, and
the cause of those several passions and inclinations, which actuate and
govern me. I am uneasy to think I approve of one object, and disapprove
of another; call one thing beautiful, and another deformed; decide
concerning truth and falshood, reason and folly, without knowing upon
what principles I proceed. I am concerned for the condition of the
learned world, which lies under such t deplorable ignorance in all these
particulars. I feel an ambition to arise in me of contributing to the
instruction of mankind, and of acquiring a name by my inventions
and discoveries. These sentiments spring up naturally in my present
disposition; and should I endeavour to banish them, by attaching myself
to any other business or diversion, I feel I should be a loser in point
of pleasure; and this is the origin of my philosophy.

But even suppose this curiosity and ambition should not transport
me into speculations without the sphere of common life, it would
necessarily happen, that from my very weakness I must be led into such
enquiries. It is certain, that superstition is much more bold in its
systems and hypotheses than philosophy; and while the latter contents
itself with assigning new causes and principles to the phaenomena, which
appear in the visible world, the former opens a world of its own, and
presents us with scenes, and beings, and objects, which are altogether
new. Since therefore it is almost impossible for the mind of man to
rest, like those of beasts, in that narrow circle of objects, which
are the subject of daily conversation and action, we ought only to
deliberate concerning the choice of our guide, and ought to prefer that
which is safest and most agreeable. And in this respect I make bold to
recommend philosophy, and shall not scruple to give it the preference to
superstition of every kind or denomination. For as superstition arises
naturally and easily from the popular opinions of mankind, it seizes
more strongly on the mind, and is often able to disturb us in the
conduct of our lives and actions. Philosoph