The fall of the Monarchy was quite inevitable, whether through the
separation from Germany or through the vacillation in the Entente
ranks--for the claims of the Italians, the Roumanians, the Serbians,
and the Czechs had all been granted. In any case the Monarchy would
have fallen and German-Austria have arisen as she has done now; and I
doubt whether the part played by that country during the proceedings
would have recommended it to the special protection of the Entente.
It is a very great mistake, whether conscious or unconscious, to
believe and to maintain that the population of German-Austria, and
especially the present leaders of Social Democracy, are devoid of any
strong national feeling. I refer to the part played by the Austrian
Social Democracy in the question of union. It was the motive power in
the union with Germany, and the papers repeated daily that no material
advantages which the Entente could offer to Austria could alter the
decision. How, therefore, can this same Social Democracy, whose entire
political views and aims are subordinate to the desire for a union
with Germany--how can this Social Democracy demand a policy which,
without doubt, must lead not only to a separation from Germany, but to
a fratricidal war with the German nation? And why condemn the
upholding of allied relations when Andrassy was abused for doing the
opposite?

But what was the situation in March, 1918, shortly before my
resignation? Germany stood at the height of her success. I do not
pretend to say that her success was real. In this connection that is
of no moment; but the Germans were persuaded that they were quite near
a victorious end, that after leaving the Eastern front they would
throw themselves on to the Western front, and that the war would end
before America had time to come in. Their reckoning was at fault, as
we all know to-day. But for the German generals the will to victory
was the leading spirit, and all decisions arrived at by Germany
against the defection of Austria-Hungary proceeded from that dominant
influence.

As already mentioned, I stated in my speech of December 11, on foreign
policy, that neither the Entente nor Germany would conclude a peace of
renunciation. Since then I have had opportunity to speak with several
men of the Entente, and consequent on the views that I obtained, I
feel I must formulate my previous opinion in still stronger terms. I
came to the firm conclusion that the Entente--England