ower, then we must say, if no alteration in this
condition of equilibrium is to be expected, the two parties must make
peace; but if an alteration is to be expected, then it can only be
favourable to one side, and therefore the other has a manifest interest
to act without delay. We see that the conception of an equilibrium
cannot explain a suspension of arms, but that it ends in the question of
the EXPECTATION OF A MORE FAVOURABLE MOMENT.

Let us suppose, therefore, that one of two States has a positive object,
as, for instance, the conquest of one of the enemy's provinces--which
is to be utilised in the settlement of peace. After this conquest, his
political object is accomplished, the necessity for action ceases, and
for him a pause ensues. If the adversary is also contented with this
solution, he will make peace; if not, he must act. Now, if we suppose
that in four weeks he will be in a better condition to act, then he has
sufficient grounds for putting off the time of action.

But from that moment the logical course for the enemy appears to be
to act that he may not give the conquered party THE DESIRED time. Of
course, in this mode of reasoning a complete insight into the state of
circumstances on both sides is supposed.

14. THUS A CONTINUANCE OF ACTION WILL ENSUE WHICH WILL ADVANCE TOWARDS A
CLIMAX.

If this unbroken continuity of hostile operations really existed,
the effect would be that everything would again be driven towards the
extreme; for, irrespective of the effect of such incessant activity in
inflaming the feelings, and infusing into the whole a greater degree of
passion, a greater elementary force, there would also follow from this
continuance of action a stricter continuity, a closer connection between
cause and effect, and thus every single action would become of more
importance, and consequently more replete with danger.

But we know that the course of action in War has seldom or never this
unbroken continuity, and that there have been many Wars in which action
occupied by far the smallest portion of time employed, the whole of the
rest being consumed in inaction. It is impossible that this should
be always an anomaly; suspension of action in War must therefore be
possible, that is no contradiction in itself. We now proceed to show how
this is.

15. HERE, THEREFORE, THE PRINCIPLE OF POLARITY IS BROUGHT INTO
REQUISITION.

As we have supposed the interests of one Commander to be always
anta