that he has character. Only those
men, therefore, can be said to have this quality whose conviction is
very constant, either because it is deeply rooted and clear in itself,
little liable to alteration, or because, as in the case of indolent men,
there is a want of mental activity, and therefore a want of motives to
change; or lastly, because an explicit act of the will, derived from an
imperative maxim of the understanding, refuses any change of opinion up
to a certain point.
Now in War, owing to the many and powerful impressions to which the mind
is exposed, and in the uncertainty of all knowledge and of all science,
more things occur to distract a man from the road he has entered upon,
to make him doubt himself and others, than in any other human activity.
The harrowing sight of danger and suffering easily leads to the feelings
gaining ascendency over the conviction of the understanding; and in the
twilight which surrounds everything a deep clear view is so difficult
that a change of opinion is more conceivable and more pardonable. It is,
at all times, only conjecture or guesses at truth which we have to act
upon. This is why differences of opinion are nowhere so great as in War,
and the stream of impressions acting counter to one's own convictions
never ceases to flow. Even the greatest impassibility of mind is hardly
proof against them, because the impressions are powerful in their
nature, and always act at the same time upon the feelings.
When the discernment is clear and deep, none but general principles and
views of action from a high standpoint can be the result; and on
these principles the opinion in each particular case immediately under
consideration lies, as it were, at anchor. But to keep to these results
of bygone reflection, in opposition to the stream of opinions and
phenomena which the present brings with it, is just the difficulty.
Between the particular case and the principle there is often a
wide space which cannot always be traversed on a visible chain of
conclusions, and where a certain faith in self is necessary and a
certain amount of scepticism is serviceable. Here often nothing else
will help us but an imperative maxim which, independent of reflection,
at once controls it: that maxim is, in all doubtful cases to adhere to
the first opinion, and not to give it up until a clear conviction
forces us to do so. We must firmly believe in the superior authority of
well-tried maxims, and under th
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