pure defensive the
positive object is wanting, and therefore, while on the defensive, our
forces cannot at the same time be directed on other objects; they can
only be employed to defeat the intentions of the enemy.

We have now to consider the opposite of the destruction of the enemy's
armed force, that is to say, the preservation of our own. These two
efforts always go together, as they mutually act and react on each
other; they are integral parts of one and the same view, and we have
only to ascertain what effect is produced when one or the other has the
predominance. The endeavour to destroy the enemy's force has a positive
object, and leads to positive results, of which the final aim is the
conquest of the enemy. The preservation of our own forces has a negative
object, leads therefore to the defeat of the enemy's intentions, that is
to pure resistance, of which the final aim can be nothing more than to
prolong the duration of the contest, so that the enemy shall exhaust
himself in it.

The effort with a positive object calls into existence the act of
destruction; the effort with the negative object awaits it.

How far this state of expectation should and may be carried we shall
enter into more particularly in the theory of attack and defence, at the
origin of which we again find ourselves. Here we shall content ourselves
with saying that the awaiting must be no absolute endurance, and that in
the action bound up with it the destruction of the enemy's armed force
engaged in this conflict may be the aim just as well as anything else.
It would therefore be a great error in the fundamental idea to suppose
that the consequence of the negative course is that we are precluded
from choosing the destruction of the enemy's military force as our
object, and must prefer a bloodless solution. The advantage which the
negative effort gives may certainly lead to that, but only at the
risk of its not being the most advisable method, as that question is
dependent on totally different conditions, resting not with ourselves
but with our opponents. This other bloodless way cannot, therefore, be
looked upon at all as the natural means of satisfying our great anxiety
to spare our forces; on the contrary, when circumstances are not
favourable, it would be the means of completely ruining them. Very many
Generals have fallen into this error, and been ruined by it. The only
necessary effect resulting from the superiority of the negative