effort
is the delay of the decision, so that the party acting takes refuge in
that way, as it were, in the expectation of the decisive moment. The
consequence of that is generally THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE ACTION as
much as possible in time, and also in space, in so far as space is
in connection with it. If the moment has arrived in which this can no
longer be done without ruinous disadvantage, then the advantage of
the negative must be considered as exhausted, and then comes forward
unchanged the effort for the destruction of the enemy's force, which was
kept back by a counterpoise, but never discarded.
We have seen, therefore, in the foregoing reflections, that there
are many ways to the aim, that is, to the attainment of the political
object; but that the only means is the combat, and that consequently
everything is subject to a supreme law: which is the DECISION BY ARMS;
that where this is really demanded by one, it is a redress which cannot
be refused by the other; that, therefore, a belligerent who takes any
other way must make sure that his opponent will not take this means of
redress, or his cause may be lost in that supreme court; hence therefore
the destruction of the enemy's armed force, amongst all the objects
which can be pursued in War, appears always as the one which overrules
all others.
What may be achieved by combinations of another kind in War we shall
only learn in the sequel, and naturally only by degrees. We content
ourselves here with acknowledging in general their possibility, as
something pointing to the difference between the reality and the
conception, and to the influence of particular circumstances. But we
could not avoid showing at once that the BLOODY SOLUTION OF THE CRISIS,
the effort for the destruction of the enemy's force, is the firstborn
son of War. If when political objects are unimportant, motives weak, the
excitement of forces small, a cautious commander tries in all kinds
of ways, without great crises and bloody solutions, to twist himself
skilfully into a peace through the characteristic weaknesses of his
enemy in the field and in the Cabinet, we have no right to find
fault with him, if the premises on which he acts are well founded and
justified by success; still we must require him to remember that he only
travels on forbidden tracks, where the God of War may surprise him; that
he ought always to keep his eye on the enemy, in order that he may not
have to defend himself with
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