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of the enemy opposed to us is the means to the end; it is so even when
the combat does not actually take place, because in that case there
lies at the root of the decision the supposition at all events that this
destruction is to be regarded as beyond doubt. It follows,
therefore, that the destruction of the enemy's military force is
the foundation-stone of all action in War, the great support of all
combinations, which rest upon it like the arch on its abutments. All
action, therefore, takes place on the supposition that if the solution
by force of arms which lies at its foundation should be realised, it
will be a favourable one. The decision by arms is, for all operations in
War, great and small, what cash payment is in bill transactions. However
remote from each other these relations, however seldom the realisation
may take place, still it can never entirely fail to occur.
If the decision by arms lies at the foundation of all combinations, then
it follows that the enemy can defeat each of them by gaining a victory
on the field, not merely in the one on which our combination directly
depends, but also in any other encounter, if it is only important
enough; for every important decision by arms--that is, destruction of
the enemy's forces--reacts upon all preceding it, because, like a liquid
element, they tend to bring themselves to a level.
Thus, the destruction of the enemy's armed force appears, therefore,
always as the superior and more effectual means, to which all others
must give way.
It is, however, only when there is a supposed equality in all other
conditions that we can ascribe to the destruction of the enemy's armed
force the greater efficacy. It would, therefore, be a great mistake to
draw the conclusion that a blind dash must always gain the victory over
skill and caution. An unskilful attack would lead to the destruction of
our own and not of the enemy's force, and therefore is not what is here
meant. The superior efficacy belongs not to the MEANS but to the END,
and we are only comparing the effect of one realised purpose with the
other.
If we speak of the destruction of the enemy's armed force, we must
expressly point out that nothing obliges us to confine this idea to the
mere physical force; on the contrary, the moral is necessarily implied
as well, because both in fact are interwoven with each other, even in
the most minute details, and therefore cannot be separated. But it is
just in conne
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