mended any government as better
than no government; and he added, that he expected that Pompeius would
manage present affairs best, and would protect the state with which he
was intrusted.

XLVIII. Pompeius[731] being thus declared consul prayed Cato to come
to him to the suburbs: and on his arrival Pompeius received him in a
friendly manner with salutations and pressing of hands, and after
acknowledging his obligations he entreated Cato to be his adviser and
his assessor in the consulship. But Cato replied, that neither had he
said what he first said out of evil disposition towards Pompeius, nor
had he said what he last said in order to win his favour, but
everything for the interest of the state; accordingly he observed that
he would give Pompeius his advice when he was privately invited, but
that in public, even if he should not be invited, he would certainly
say what he thought. And he did as he said. In the first place, when
Pompeius was proposing laws with new penalties and severe proceedings
against those who had already bribed the people, Cato advised him not
to care about the past, but to attend to the future, for he said, it
was not easy to determine at what point the inquiry into past offences
should stop, and if penalties be imposed after the offences, those
would be hardly dealt with who were punished by a law which they were
not breaking at the time of their wrong-doing. In the next place, when
many men of rank were under trial, some of whom were friends and
relations of Pompeius, Cato observing that Pompeius was giving way to
the greater part of them and yielding, rebuked him firmly and roused
him up. Though Pompeius himself had caused a law to be passed which
did not allow the panegyrics which used to be pronounced on those who
were under trial, he wrote a panegyric on Munatius Plancus[732] on
the occasion of his trial and handed it in, but Cato by stopping his
ears with his hands, for he happened to be one of the judices,
prevented the testimonial from being read. Plancus challenged Cato as
one of the judices after the speeches, but nevertheless he was
convicted. And altogether Cato was a kind of thing difficult and
unmanageable for persons accused, as they were neither willing to have
him to be a judex, nor could they venture to challenge him. For not a
few were convicted because, by being unwilling to have Cato for one of
their judices, they were considered to show that they had no
confidence in the