pore_.

Quorum.--It would hardly be possible for all members to be present every
day, therefore a number less than the whole should have authority to act.
But this number should not be very small. The several constitutions fix
the quorum for each house, usually at a majority of the members elected to
it. But a smaller number has power of adjournment from day to day, so that
the organization may not be lost; and it may compel the attendance of
absent members, by sending the sergeant-at-arms after them.

Publicity.--On the theory that legislators are servants of the people, we
would naturally expect the proceedings to be made public. And so they are.
Publicity is secured in the following ways:

1. In accordance with the constitutional provision, each house keeps a
journal of its proceedings which it publishes from time to time, usually
every day.

2. Spectators are admitted to witness the daily sessions.

3. Newspaper reporters are admitted, and are furnished facilities for
making full and accurate reports.

Privileges of Members.--In order that their constituents may not, for
frivolous or sinister reasons, be deprived of their services in the
legislature, the members of each house are _privileged from arrest_
"during the session of their respective houses, and in going to and
returning from the same." Nor can civil suit be brought against them
during that time. But they may be arrested for treason, (defined in the
constitution), felony, or breach of the peace, because if guilty they are
unworthy of a seat in the legislature.

And in order that there may be the utmost _freedom of speech_ in the
legislature, that any member who knows of wrong being done may feel
perfectly free to say so, the constitution of each state provides that
"for any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in
any other place."

Compensation.--Members of the legislature receive for their services a
salary, which is sometimes specified in the constitution, but which is
usually fixed by law. In the latter case no increase voted can be in
effect until a new legislative term begins. This proviso is, of course,
designed to remove the temptation to increase the salary for selfish ends.

In some countries no salary is paid to legislators, the theory being that
with the temptation of salary removed only persons of public spirit will
accept election. Our argument is that unless some remuneration be given,
many persons of publi