take any, the slightest, measure of any kind for any emergency; in a
word, that it expected no attacks, no war, saw no fire, and did not
prepare to meet and quench one.

It were, perhaps, better for Lincoln if he could muster courage and
act by himself according to his nature, rather than follow so many, or
even any single adviser. Less and less I understand Mr. Lincoln, but
as his private secretary assures me that Lincoln has great judgment
and great energy, I suggested to the secretary to say to Lincoln he
should be more himself.

Being _tete-a-tete_ with McDowell, I saw him do things of details
which in any, even half-way organized army, belong to the speciality
of a chief of the staff. I, of course, wondered at it. McDowell, who
commands what in Europe would be called a large corps, told me that
General Scott allowed him not to form a complete staff, such a one as
he, McDowell, wished.

And all this, so to speak, on the eve of a battle, when the army faces
the enemy. It seems that genuine staff duties are something altogether
unknown to the military senility of the army. McDowell received this
corps in the most chaotic state. Almost with his own hands he
organized, or rather put together, the artillery. Brigades are
scarcely formed; the commanders of brigades do not know their
commands, and the soldiers do not know their generals--and still they
consider Scott to be a great general!

The Congress, well-intentioned, but entangled in formulas, slowly
feels its way. The Congress is composed of better elements than is the
administration, and it is ludicrous to see how the administration
takes airs of hauteur with the Congress. This Congress is in an
abnormal condition _for the task of directing a revolution_; _a
formula can be thrown in its face_ almost at every bold step. The
administration is virtually irresponsible, more so than the government
of any constitutional nation whatever. What great things this
administration could carry out! Congress will consecrate, legalize,
sanction everything. Perhaps no harm would have resulted if the Senate
and the House had contained some new, fresher elements directly from
the boiling, popular cauldron. Such men would take a _position_ at
once. Many of the leaders in both Houses were accustomed for many
years to make only opposition. But a long opposition influences and
disorganizes the judgment, forms not those genuine statesmen able to
grasp great events. For such emergencie