Some time ago it was reported that McClellan considered this war had
become a duel of artillery. Fools wondered and applauded. I then
protested against putting such an absurdity in McClellan's mouth; now
I must believe it. To be sure, every battle is in part a duel of
artillery, but ends or is decided by charges of infantry or cavalry.
Cannonading alone never constituted and decided a battle. No position
can be taken by cannonading alone, and shells alone do not always
force an enemy to abandon a position. Napoleon, an artillerist _par
excellence_, considered campaigns and battles to be something more
than duels of artillery. The great battle of Borodino, and all others,
were decided when batteries were stormed and taken. Eylau was a battle
of charges by cavalry and by infantry, besides a terrible cannonading,
etc., etc. McClellan spoke with pride of the fortifications of
Washington, and pointed to one of the forts as having a greater
profile than had the world-renowned Malakoff. What a confusion of
notions, what a misappreciation of relative conditions!

I cannot express my sad, mournful feelings, during this conversation
with McClellan. We spoke about the necessity of dividing his large
army into corps. McClellan took from the table an Army Almanac, and
pointed to the names of generals to whom he intended to give the
command of corps. He feels the urgency of the case, and said that Gen.
Scott prevented him from doing it; but as soon as he, McClellan, shall
be free to act, the division will be made. So General Scott is
everywhere to defend senile routine against progress, and the
experience of modern times.

The rebels deserve, to the end of time, many curses from outraged
humanity. By their treason they forced upon the free institutions of
the North the necessity of curtailing personal liberty and other
rights; to make use of despotism for the sake of self-defence.

The enemy concentrates and shortens his lines, and McClellan dares not
even tread on the enemy's heels. Instead of forcing the enemy to do
what we want, and upturn his schemes, McClellan seemingly does the
bidding of Beauregard. We advance as much as Beauregard allows us to
do. New tactics, to be sure, but at any rate not Napoleonic.

The fighting in the West and some small successes here are obtained by
rough levies; and those imbecile, regular martinets surrounding
McClellan still nurse his distrust in the volunteers. All the wealth,
energy, intelle