sense
clearly show that the foreign cabinets cannot do it, and thus stultify
themselves. Seward believes that his rhetoric is irresistible, and
will move the cabinets of France and of England. * * * Not the
"recognition of belligerents;" let the rebels slip off from Manassas,
etc. Mr. Seward would do better for himself and for the country to
give up meddling with the operations of the war, and backing the
bloodless campaigns of the _strategian_. But Mr. Seward, carried away
by his imagination, believes that the cabinets will yield to his
persuasive voice, and then, oh! what a feather in his diplomatic cap
before the befogged Mr. Lincoln, and before the people. But _pia
desideria_.

In all the wars, as well as in all the single campaigns and battles,
every _captain_ deserving this name aimed at breaking his enemy in the
centre or at seizing his basis of operations, wherefrom the enemy
draws its resources and forces. The great _strategian_ changed all
this; he goes directly to the circumference instead of aiming at the
heart.

Mr. Seward, answering Mr. Dayton's dispatch concerning his, Dayton's,
conversation with Louis Napoleon, points to Europe being likewise
menaced by revolutionists. Unnecessary spread-eagleism, and an awful
want of any, even diplomatic, tact. I hope that Mr. Dayton, who has so
much sound sense and discernment, will keep to himself this freak of
Mr. Seward's untamable imagination.

Under the influence of insinuations received from his English friends,
Senator Sumner said to Mr. Mercier (I was present) that with every
steamer he expects a joint letter of admonition directed by the French
and English to our government. Mr. Mercier retorted, "How can you,
sir, have such notions? you are too great a nation to be treated in
this way. Such letters would do for Greece, etc., but not for you." I
was sorry and glad for the lesson thus given.

Archbishop Hughes was not over-successful in France, and went off
rather second-best in the opinion of the press, of the public, and of
the Catholic, even ultra-Montane clergy of France. All this on
account of his conditional anti-slaverism and unconditional
pro-slaverism. All this was easily to be foreseen. His Eminence is in
Rome, and from Rome is to influence Spain in our favor.

Oh diplomacy! oh times of Capucine and Jesuit fathers and of Abbes!
We, the children of the eighteenth century, we recall you to life. I
do not suppose that the whole diplomatic activity