diplomatical business affairs. In all such matters
he is now at home, as if he had done it for years and years. He is no
more spread-eagle in his diplomatic relations; is easy and prompt in
all secondary questions relating to secondary interests, and daily
emerging from international complications.

Hitherto the war policy of the administration, as inspired and
directed by Scott, was rather to receive blows, and then to try to
ward them off. I expect young McClellan to deal blows, and thus to
upturn the Micawber policy. Perhaps Gen. Scott believed that his name
and example would awe the rebels, and that they would come back after
having made a little fuss and done some little mischief. But Scott's
greatness was principally built up by the Whigs, and his hold on
Democrats was not very great. Witness the events of Polk's and
Pierce's administrations. His Mississippi-Atlantic strategy is a
delirium of a softening brain. Seward's enemies say that he puts up
and sustains Scott, because in the case of success Scott will not be
in Seward's way for the future Presidency. Mr. Lincoln, an old Whig,
has the Whig-worship for Scott; and as Mr. Lincoln, in 1851, stumped
for Scott, the candidate for the Presidency, the many eulogies
showered by Lincoln upon Scott still more strengthened the worship
which, of course, Seward lively entertains in Lincoln's bosom. Thus
the relics of Whigism direct now the destinies of the North. Mr.
Lincoln, Gen. Scott, Mr. Seward, form a triad, with satellites like
Bates and Smith in the Cabinet. But the Whigs have not the reputation
of governmental vigor, decision, and promptitude.

The vitiated impulse and direction given by Gen. Scott at the start,
still prevails, and it will be very difficult to bring it on the right
track--to change the general as well as the war policy from the
defensive, as it is now, to the offensive, as it ought to have been
from the beginning. The North is five to one in men, and one hundred
to one in material resources. Any one with brains and energy could
suppress the rebellion in eight weeks from to-day.

Mr. Lincoln in some way has a slender historical resemblance to Louis
XVI.--similar goodness, honesty, good intentions; but the size of
events seems to be too much for him.

And so now Mr. Lincoln is wholly overshadowed by Seward. If by miracle
the revolt may end in a short time, Mr. Seward will have most of the
credit for it. In the long run the blame for eventual disa