es, now become necessaries of life, were
raised to an exorbitant price, and bore much upon the finances of the
citizen, whose family could not comfortably exist without them. Add to
this, as most of the money loaned to the Government for the purposes
of the war came from the pockets of merchants, they were rendered
incapable of continuing these disbursements in consequence of this
interruption to their trade; whence the cause of that impending
bankruptcy with which the Government was at one time threatened.... At
a critical period of the war [April, 1814] Congress found it
necessary to remove all restrictions upon commerce, both foreign and
domestic. It is a lamentable fact, however, that the adventurous
merchant found no alleviation from these indulgences, his vessels
being uniformly prevented by a strong blockading force, not only from
going out, but from coming into port, at the most imminent risk of
capture. The risk did not stop here; for the islands and ports most
frequented by American vessels being known to the enemy, he was
enabled from his abundance of means to intercept them there also. The
coasting trade, that most valuable appendage to an extensive
mercantile establishment in the United States, was entirely
annihilated. The southern and northern sections of the Union were
unable to exchange their commodities, except upon a contracted scale
through the medium of land carriage, and then only at a great loss; so
that, upon the whole, nothing in a national point of view appeared to
be more loudly called for by men of all parties than a naval force
adequate to the protection of our commerce, and the raising of the
blockade of our coast."

Such was the experience which sums up the forgotten bitter truth,
concerning a war which has left in the United States a prevalent
impression of distinguished success, because of a few brilliant naval
actions and the closing battle of New Orleans. The lesson to be
deduced is not that the country at that time should have sought to
maintain a navy approaching equality to the British. In the state of
national population and revenue, it was no more possible to attempt
this than that it would be expedient to do it now, under the present
immense development of resources and available wealth. What had been
possible during the decade preceding the war,--had the nation so
willed,--was to place the navy on such a footing, in numbers and
constitution, as would have made persistence in th