9, 13, 23, 1813.

[210] Niles' Register, vol. viii. p. 311. Quoted from a Norfolk paper.

[211] American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, vol. i. p. 1017.

[212] Ibid., vol. ii. p. 12.

[213] American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, vol. ii. p. 87.

[214] Ibid., vol. i. p. 1017; vol. ii. pp. 12, 87.

[215] Ante, vol. i. pp. 402-404.

[216] Admiralty's Letter to Warren. Feb. 10, 1813.

CHAPTER XIV

MARITIME OPERATIONS EXTERNAL TO THE WATERS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1813-1814

In broad generalization, based upon analysis of conditions, it has
been said that the seacoast of the United States was in 1812 a
defensive frontier, from which, as from all defensive lines, there
should be, and was, opportunity for offensive returns; for action
planned to relieve the shore-line, and the general military situation,
by inflicting elsewhere upon the opponent injury, harassment, and
perplexity. The last chapter dealt with the warfare depending upon the
seaboard chiefly from the defensive point of view; to illustrate the
difficulties, the blows, and the sufferings, to which the country was
exposed, owing to inability to force the enemy away from any large
portion of the coast. The pressure was as universal as it was
inexorable and irresistible.

It remains still to consider the employment and effects of the one
offensive maritime measure left open by the exigencies of the war; the
cruises directed against the enemy's commerce, and the characteristic
incidents to which they gave rise. In this pursuit were engaged both
the national ships of war and those equipped by the enterprise of the
mercantile community; but, as the operations were in their nature more
consonant to the proper purpose of privateers, so the far greater
number of these caused them to play a part much more considerable in
effect, though proportionately less fruitful in conspicuous action.
Fighting, when avoidable, is to the privateer a misdirection of
energy. Profit is his object, by depredation upon the enemy's
commerce; not the preservation of that of his own people. To the ship
of war, on the other hand, protection of the national shipping is the
primary concern; and for that reason it becomes her to shun no
encounter by which she may hope to remove from the seas a hostile
cruiser.

The limited success of the frigates in their attempts against British
trade has been noted, and attributed to the general fact that their
cruises were con