ith special rigor in the Caribbean Sea and over
the Western Atlantic. It was impossible to impose the same strict
prescription upon the coastwise trade, by which chiefly the
indispensable continuous intercourse between the several parts of the
United Kingdom was maintained. Before the introduction of steam this
had a consequence quite disproportionate to the interior traffic by
land; and its development, combined with the feeling of greater
security as the British Islands were approached, occasioned in the
narrow seas, and on the coasts of Europe, a dispersion of vessels not
to be seen elsewhere. This favored the depredations of the light,
swift, and handy cruisers that alone are capable of profiting by such
an opportunity, through their power to evade the numerous, but
necessarily scattered, ships of war, which under these circumstances
must patrol the sea, like a watchman on beat, as the best substitute
for the more formal and regularized convoy protection, when that
ceases to apply.
From the end of the summer of 1813, when this tendency to distant
enterprise became predominant, to the corresponding season a year
later, there were captured by American cruisers some six hundred and
fifty British vessels, chiefly merchantmen; a number which had
increased to between four and five hundred more, when the war ended in
the following winter.[219] An intelligible account of such
multitudinous activities can be framed only by selecting amid the mass
some illustrative particulars, accompanied by a general estimate of
the conditions they indicate and the results they exemplify. Thus it
may be stated, with fair approach to precision, that from September
30, 1813, to September 30, 1814, there were taken six hundred and
thirty-nine British vessels, of which four hundred and twenty-four
were in seas that may be called remote from the United States. From
that time to the end of the war, about six months, the total captures
were four hundred and fourteen, of which those distant were two
hundred and ninety-three. These figures, larger actually and in
impression than they are relatively to the total of British shipping,
represent the offensive maritime action of the United States during
the period in question; but, in considering them, it must be
remembered that such results were possible only because the sea was
kept open to British commerce by the paramount power of the British
navy. This could not prevent all mishaps; but it reduced
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