always ignominious to suffer ignominy; but it always is so to
deserve it.

President Washington, in his last annual message, December 7, 1796,
defined the situation then confronting the United States, and
indicated its appropriate remedy, in the calm and forcible terms which
characterized all his perceptions. "It is in our own experience, that
the most sincere neutrality is not a sufficient guard against the
depredations of nations at war. To secure respect for a neutral flag
requires a naval force, organized and ready, to vindicate it from
insult or aggression. This may even prevent the necessity of going to
war, by discouraging belligerent powers from committing such
violations of the rights of the neutral party as may, first or last,
leave no other option" [than war]. The last sentence is that of the
statesman and soldier, who accurately appreciates the true office and
sphere of arms in international relations. His successor, John Adams,
yearly renewed his recommendation for the development of the navy;
although, not being a military man, he seems to have looked rather
exclusively on the defensive aspect, and not to have realized that
possible enemies are more deterred by the fear of offensive action
against themselves than by recognition of a defensive force which
awaits attack at an enemy's pleasure. Moreover, in his administration,
it was not Great Britain, but France, that was most actively engaged
in violating the neutral rights of American shipping, and French
commercial interests then presented nothing upon which retaliation
could take effect. The American problem then was purely defensive,--to
destroy the armed ships engaged in molesting the national commerce.

President Jefferson, whose influence was paramount with the dominant
party which remained in power from his inauguration in 1801 to the
war, based his policy upon the conviction, expressed in his inaugural,
that this "was the only government where every man would meet
invasions of the public order as his own personal concern;" and that
"a well-disciplined militia is our best reliance for the first moments
of war, till regulars may relieve them." In pursuance of these
fundamental principles, it was doubtless logical to recommend in his
first annual message that, "beyond the small force which will probably
be wanted for actual service in the Mediterranean [against the
Barbary pirates], whatever annual sum you may think proper to
appropriate to naval p