ans shall have proved fruitless.

"2. That if either of the two should at any time be at war with
any other Power, no subject or citizen of the other contracting
party shall be allowed to take out letters of marque from such
Power under pain of being treated and dealt with as a pirate.

"3. That in such case of war between either of the two parties
and a third Power, no subject or citizen of the other contracting
party shall be allowed to enter into the service naval or military
of such third Power.

"4. That in such case of war as aforesaid, neither of the contracting
parties shall afford assistance to the enemies of the other by sea
or by land, unless war should break out between the two contracting
parties themselves after the failure of all endeavors to settle
their differences in the manner specified in Article 1."

At the time Lord Palmerston expressed these opinions, we had just
closed the Mexican war, with vast acquisition of territory and with
a display of military power on distant fields of conquest which
surprised European statesmen. Our maritime interests were almost
equal to those of the United Kingdom, our prosperity was great,
the prestige of the Nation was growing. In the thirteen intervening
years between that date and the outbreak of the Southern Rebellion
we had grown enormously in wealth, our Pacific possessions had
shown an extraordinary production of precious metals, our population
had increased more than ten millions. If an alliance with the
United States was desirable for England in 1848, it was far more
desirable in 1861, and Lord Palmerston being Prime Minister in the
latter year, his power to propose and promote it was far greater.
Is there any reason that will satisfactorily account for His
Lordship's abandonment of this ideal relation of friendship between
the two countries except that he saw a speedier way of adding to
the power of England by conniving at the destruction of the Union?
His change from the policy which he painted in 1848 to that which
he acted in 1861 cannot be satisfactorily explained upon any other
hypothesis than that he could not resist the temptation to cripple
and humiliate the Great Republic.

FIXED POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

This brief history of the spirit rather than the events which
characterized the foreign relations of the United States during
the civil war, has been undertaken with no desire to revive th