mely difficult to see how any candid person
can answer this question except by the admission that for all practical
purposes, and except on possible but very extreme occasions, the right
of the British Parliament to legislate for Ireland is morally not only
impaired but destroyed. The supporters of the Government of Ireland Bill
have admitted again and again that it constitutes what they term a
Parliamentary compact; it embodies, in other words, a solemn contract
between Great Britain and the people of Ireland that the British
Parliament, whatever be its legal power, shall not legislate about Irish
affairs without summoning Irish representatives to share in its
deliberations. This covenant is made for great and valuable
consideration, namely, the withdrawal of the Irish representatives from
the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and the consequent acquisition by
the British Parliament of power to legislate not only on every British
but on every Imperial concern without consulting the wishes of the Irish
people. This is in a moral point of view little less than a treaty; it
is an engagement which England could not break, or incur the imputation
of breaking, without dishonour. With all this every man of sense and of
honour agrees; but if this be so, it is impossible to see how any one
can maintain that this Parliamentary compact does not morally impair, as
far as Ireland is concerned, the sovereignty or legislative supremacy of
the British Parliament. It may be doubted whether the most earnest
Gladstonian really and seriously maintains that under the Gladstonian
Constitution the British Parliament sitting at Westminster could or ever
would legislate for Ireland in contravention at any rate of the patent
and apparent meaning of the Constitution. All that is really maintained
is that the British Parliament would retain a legal power of doing that
which would never be done by it. There is, however, it is suggested,
convenience in retaining a nominal sovereignty which is not intended for
real use. Convenience there may be, but there is also immense danger.
The Irish Parliament we will suppose acts in a way which is most
annoying to England, but the Irish Parliament at the same time takes
care not to violate a line of the Constitution. The temptation to use
our sovereign authority is great, and likely enough may prove
irresistible; yet if we use it every Irishman, and many Englishmen for
that matter, will accuse England of bad fa