only on special
occasions and only for a special purpose, namely the revision or
alteration of the Gladstonian Constitution.

That the existence of these three bodies, each normally exercising the
different functions or powers I have attributed to them, constitutes an
unmistakable, and I should myself say a fundamental, change in the
existing English Constitution with its one sovereign Parliament of the
United Kingdom, hardly in my judgment requires or admits of proof. If
the change be denied, I have no course but to leave the decision of the
question whether such a change can be fairly ignored to the intelligence
of my readers.[66]

The Gladstonian Constitution, if it worked in the way contemplated by
its authors--if everything, that is to say, went exactly as it was
wished, and everybody acted exactly in the manner in which
constitutionally they ought to act--would provide a complicated but, as
I have already said, most ingenious solution of the problem before us.
The British Parliament would sit at Westminster undisturbed by any Irish
obstructives, and legislate for Great Britain and the whole British
Empire in accordance with the wishes of the people of England and
Scotland. Not only would Irish obstruction vanish, but what is even
better, the necessity of considering Irish questions at all would
disappear. English legislators would not be called upon to pay more
attention to the affairs of Ireland than to the affairs of Canada or of
New Zealand. The Irish Parliament would take the whole burden of
legislation for Ireland off our hands, and Irishmen if they did not like
Irish laws would have nobody to complain of but Irish legislators. But
the Irish Parliament whilst it saved England from all trouble would, if
the Constitution worked properly, give England no trouble whatever. If
Bills were proposed or Acts passed at Dublin in violation of the
Constitution they would be pronounced void by the Privy Council, and all
Ireland would at once acquiesce in the final decisions of that exalted
tribunal. If on the other hand the Irish House of Parliament were to
pass enactments which though not unconstitutional were inexpedient, then
foolish proposals would be nullified by the veto of the Lord-Lieutenant.
The contribution from Ireland would be duly collected and be paid up to
the day, since its collection would lie in the hands of British
officials; and should any difficulty arise, the collectors would be
aided by the Irish