t of Russia's collapse
after the Great War.

The nominal sovereignty in Manchuria is still Chinese; the Chinese have
the civil administration, an army, and the appointment of the Viceroy.
But the Japanese also have troops in Manchuria; they have the railways,
the industrial enterprises, and the complete economic and military
control. The Chinese Viceroy could not remain in power a week if he were
displeasing to the Japanese, which, however, he takes care not to be.
(See Note A.) The same situation was being brought about in Shantung.

Shantung brings us to what Japan did in the Great War. In 1914, China
could easily have been induced to join the Allies and to set to work to
turn the Germans out of Kiao-Chow, but this did not suit the Japanese,
who undertook the work themselves and insisted upon the Chinese
remaining neutral (until 1917). Having captured Tsing-tau, they
presented to the Chinese the famous Twenty-One Demands, which gave the
Chinese Question its modern form. These demands, as originally presented
in January 1915, consisted of five groups. The first dealt with
Shantung, demanding that China should agree in advance to whatever terms
Japan might ultimately make with Germany as regarded this Chinese
province, that the Japanese should have the right to construct certain
specified railways, and that certain ports (unspecified) should be
opened to trade; also that no privileges in Shantung should be granted
to any Power other than Japan. The second group concerns South Manchuria
and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and demands what is in effect a
protectorate, with control of railways, complete economic freedom for
Japanese enterprise, and exclusion of all other foreign industrial
enterprise. The third group gives Japan a monopoly of the mines and iron
and steel works in a certain region of the Yangtze,[63] where we claim
a sphere of influence. The fourth group consists of a single demand,
that China shall not cede any harbour, bay or island to any Power except
Japan. The fifth group, which was the most serious, demanded that
Japanese political, financial, and military advisers should be employed
by the Chinese Government; that the police in important places should be
administered by Chinese and Japanese jointly, and should be largely
Japanese in _personnel_; that China should purchase from Japan at least
50 per cent. of her munitions, or obtain them from a Sino-Japanese
arsenal to be established in China, controlled by