shes to establish real
Parliamentary government, but it is not likely to come into power unless
the existing regime suffers some severe diplomatic humiliation. If the
Washington Conference had compelled the evacuation of not only Shantung
but also Vladivostok by diplomatic pressure, the effect on the internal
government of Japan would probably have been excellent.

The Japanese are firmly persuaded that they have no friends, and that
the Americana are their implacable foes. One gathers that the
Government regards war with America as unavoidable in the long run. The
argument would be that the economic imperialism of the United States
will not tolerate the industrial development of a formidable rival in
the Pacific, and that sooner or later the Japanese will be presented
with the alternative of dying by starvation or on the battlefield. Then
Bushido will come into play, and will lead to choice of the battlefield
in preference to starvation. Admiral Sato[91] (the Japanese Bernhardi,
as he is called) maintains that absence of Bushido in the Americans will
lead to their defeat, and that their money-grubbing souls will be
incapable of enduring the hardships and privations of a long war. This,
of course, is romantic nonsense. Bushido is no use in modern war, and
the Americans are quite as courageous and obstinate as the Japanese. A
war might last ten years, but it would certainly end in the defeat of
Japan.

One is constantly reminded of the situation between England and Germany
in the years before 1914. The Germans wanted to acquire a colonial
empire by means similar to those which we had employed; so do the
Japanese. We considered such methods wicked when employed by foreigners;
so do the Americans. The Germans developed their industries and roused
our hostility by competition; the Japanese are similarly competing with
America in Far Eastern markets. The Germans felt themselves encircled by
our alliances, which we regarded as purely defensive; the Japanese,
similarly, found themselves isolated at Washington (except for French
sympathy) since the superior diplomatic skill of the Americans has
brought us over to their side. The Germans at last, impelled by terrors
largely of their own creation, challenged the whole world, and fell; it
is very much to be feared that Japan may do likewise. The pros and cons
are so familiar in the case of Germany that I need not elaborate them
further, since the whole argument can be transferred