TNOTES:
[Footnote 99: For the history of Chinese railways, see Tyau, op. cit.
pp. 183 ff.]
[Footnote 100: _China in_ 1918. Published by the _Peking Leader_, pp.
45-6.]
[Footnote 101: Op. cit. chap. xi.]
[Footnote 102: _China in_ 1918, p. 26. There is perhaps some mistake in
the figures given for iron ore, as the Tayeh mines alone are estimated
by some to contain 700,000,000 tons of iron ore. Coleman, op cit. p.
51.]
[Footnote 103: Page 63. The 1922 _Year Book_ gives 19,500,000 tons of
coal production.]
[Footnote 104: _Modern China,_ p, 265.]
[Footnote 105: Pages 74-5.]
[Footnote 106: Coleman, op. cit. chap. xiv.]
[Footnote 107: It seems it would be inaccurate to maintain that there is
nothing on the subject in the Gospels. An eminent American divine
pointed out in print, as regards the advice against laying up treasure
where moth and rust doth corrupt, that "moth and rust do not get at Mr.
Rockefeller's oil wells, and thieves do not often break through and
steal a railway. What Jesus condemned was hoarding wealth." See Upton
Sinclair, _The Profits of Religion_, 1918, p. 175.]
[Footnote 108: Page 237.]
[Footnote 109: Page 218.]
CHAPTER XV
THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA
In this chapter I propose to take, as far as I am able, the standpoint
of a progressive and public-spirited Chinese, and consider what reforms,
in what order, I should advocate in that case.
To begin with, it is clear that China must be saved by her own efforts,
and cannot rely upon outside help. In the international situation, China
has had both good and bad fortune. The Great War was unfortunate,
because it gave Japan temporarily a free hand; the collapse of Tsarist
Russia was fortunate, because it put an end to the secret alliance of
Russians and Japanese; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was unfortunate,
because it compelled us to abet Japanese aggression even against our own
economic interests; the friction between Japan and America was
fortunate; but the agreement arrived at by the Washington Conference,
though momentarily advantageous as regards Shantung, is likely, in the
long run, to prove unfortunate, since it will make America less willing
to oppose Japan. For reasons which I set forth in Chap. X., unless China
becomes strong, either the collapse of Japan or her unquestioned
ascendency in the Far East is almost certain to prove disastrous to
China; and one or other of these is very likely to come about. All the
Gre
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