ou do?" "Do? Do what?" "I mean, how do you feel?" "How do I
feel? With my fingers, of course; but I can see very well." "No, no; I
mean, how do you find yourself?" "Then why did you not say so? I never
exactly noticed, but I will tell you next time I lose myself."
(3) _Illicit conjunction_ ([Greek: synthesis]).
Socrates is good. Socrates is a musician. Therefore Socrates is a good
musician.
(4) _Illicit disjunction_ ([Greek: diairesis]).
Socrates is a good musician. Therefore he is a good man.
(5) _Ambiguity of pronunciation_ ([Greek: prosodia], _fallacia
accentus_).
Analogies to words that differ only in accent, such as [Greek: ou-with
accents {psili and persipomeni}] and [Greek: ou-with accents {psili
and oxia}], may be found in differences of pronunciation. "Hair very
thick, sir," said a barber to a customer, whose hair was bushy, but
beginning to turn grey. "Yes, I daresay. But I would rather have it
thick than thin." "Ah, too thick to-day, sir." "But I don't want
to dye it." "Excuse me, sir, I mean the hair of the hatmosphere,
t-o-d-a-y, to-day."
"He said, saddle me the ass. And they saddled _him_."
(6) _Ambiguity of inflexion_ ([Greek: schema tes lexeos], _Figura
dictionis_).
This is not easy to make intelligible in English. The idea is that
a termination may be ambiguously interpreted, a neuter participle,
_e.g._, taken for an active. Thus: "George is ailing". "Doing what,
did you say? Ailing? What is he ailing? Ginger-aleing?"
Non-Verbal Fallacies, or Fallacies in thought, are a more important
division. Aristotle distinguishes seven.
Of these, three are comparatively unimportant and trifling. One of
them, known to the Schoolmen as _Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum_,
was peculiar to Interrogative disputation. It is the trick of putting
more than one question as one, so that a simple Yes commits the
respondent to something implied. "Have you left off beating your
father?" If you answer Yes, that implies that you have been in the
habit of beating him. "Has the practice of excessive drinking ceased
in your part of the country?" Such questions were unfair when the
Respondent could answer only Yes or No. The modern disputant who
demands a plain answer Yes or No, is sometimes guilty of this trick.
Two others, the fallacies known as _A dicto simpliciter ad dictum
secundum quid_, and _A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter_,
are as common in modern dialectic as they were in ancient. The tr
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