C] The notions of matter and of space are inseparable. We
derive the notion of space from matter and form. But we have no
adequate conception either of matter or space. Matter in its
ultimate resolution is as unintelligible as what men call mind,
spirit, or by whatever other name they may express the power
which makes itself known by acts. Anaxagoras laid down the
distinction between intelligence [Greek: nous] and matter, and
he said that intelligence impressed motion on matter, and so
separated the elements of matter and gave them order; but he
probably only assumed a beginning, as Simplicius says, as a
foundation of his philosophical teaching. Empedocles said, "The
universe always existed." He had no idea of what is called
creation. Ocellus Lucanus (i, Sec. 2) maintained that the Universe
([Greek: to pan]) was imperishable and uncreated. Consequently
it is eternal. He admitted the existence of God; but his
theology would require some discussion. On the contrary, the
Brachmans, according to Strabo (p. 713, ed. Cas.), taught that
the universe was created and perishable; and the creator and
administrator of it pervades the whole. The author of the book
of Solomon's Wisdom says (xi. 17): "Thy Almighty hand made the
world of matter without form," which may mean that matter
existed already.
The common Greek word which we translate "matter" is [Greek:
hyle]. It is the stuff that things are made of.
Matter consists of elemental parts ([Greek: stoicheia]) of which all
material objects are made. But nothing is permanent in form. The nature
of the universe, according to Antoninus' expression (iv. 36), "loves
nothing so much as to change the things which are, and to make new
things like them. For everything that exists is in a manner the seed of
that which will be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast
into the earth or into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion." All
things then are in a constant flux and change; some things are dissolved
into the elements, others come in their places; and so the "whole
universe continues ever young and perfect" (xii. 23).
Antoninus has some obscure expressions about what he calls "seminal
principles" ([Greek: spermatikoi logoi]). He opposes them to the
Epicurean atoms (vi. 24), and consequently his "seminal principles" are
not material atoms which wander about at hazard, and combine
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