in conformity
to this disposition; but experience shows that men's notions about
justice are as confused as their actions are inconsistent with the true
notion of justice. The emperor's notion of justice is clear enough, but
not practical enough for all mankind. "Let there be freedom from
perturbations with respect to the things which come from the external
cause; and let there be justice in the things done by virtue of the
internal cause, that is, let there be movement and action terminating in
this, in social acts, for this is according to thy nature" (ix. 31). In
another place (ix. 1) he says that "he who acts unjustly acts
impiously," which follows of course from all that he says in various
places. He insists on the practice of truth as a virtue and as a means
to virtue, which no doubt it is: for lying even in indifferent things
weakens the understanding; and lying maliciously is as great a moral
offense as a man can be guilty of, viewed both as showing an habitual
disposition, and viewed with respect to consequences. He couples the
notion of justice with action. A man must not pride himself on having
some fine notion of justice in his head, but he must exhibit his justice
in act, like St. James' notion of faith. But this is enough.

The Stoics, and Antoninus among them, call some things beautiful
([Greek: kala]) and some ugly ([Greek: aischra]), and as they are beautiful
so they are good, and as they are ugly so they are evil, or bad (ii. 1).
All these things, good and evil, are in our power, absolutely, some of
the stricter Stoics would say; in a manner only, as those who would not
depart altogether from common sense would say; practically they are to a
great degree in the power of some persons and in some circumstances, but
in a small degree only in other persons and in other circumstances. The
Stoics maintain man's free will as to the things which are in his power;
for as to the things which are out of his power, free will terminating
in action is of course excluded by the very terms of the expression. I
hardly know if we can discover exactly Antoninus' notion of the free
will of man, nor is the question worth the inquiry. What he does mean
and does say is intelligible. All the things which are not in our power
([Greek: aproaireta]) are indifferent: they are neither good nor bad,
morally. Such are life, health, wealth, power, disease, poverty, and
death. Life and death are all men's portion. Health, wealth, powe