also about
the Deity, who in power is most mighty, in beauty most comely,
in life immortal, and in virtue supreme: wherefore though he is
invisible to human nature, he is seen by his very works." Other
passages to the same purpose are quoted by Gataker (p. 382).
Bishop Butler has the same as to the soul: "Upon the whole,
then, our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly
instruments, which the living persons, ourselves, make use of
to perceive and move with." If this is not plain enough, be
also says: "It follows that our organized bodies are no more
ourselves, or part of ourselves, than any other matter around
us." (Compare Anton, x. 38).

[C] The reader may consult Discourse V., "Of the existence and
nature of God," in John Smith's "Select Discourses." He has
prefixed as a text to this Discourse, the striking passage of
Agapetus, Paraenes. Sec. 3: "He who knows himself will know God;
and he who knows God will be made like to God; and he will be
made like to God, who has become worthy of God; and he becomes
worthy of God, who does nothing unworthy of God, but thinks the
things that are his, and speaks what he thinks, and does what
he speaks." I suppose that the old saying, "Know thyself,"
which is attributed to Socrates and others, had a larger
meaning than the narrow sense which is generally given to it.
(Agapetus, ed. Stephan. Schoning, Franeker, 1608. This volume
contains also the Paraeneses of Nilus.)

There is in man, that is in the reason, the intelligence, a superior
faculty which if it is exercised rules all the rest. This is the ruling
faculty ([Greek: to hegemonikon]), which Cicero (De Natura Deorum, ii.
11) renders by the Latin word Principatus, "to which nothing can or
ought to be superior." Antoninus often uses this term and others which
are equivalent. He names it (vii. 64) "the governing intelligence." The
governing faculty is the master of the soul (v. 26). A man must
reverence only his ruling faculty and the divinity within him. As we
must reverence that which is supreme in the universe, so we must
reverence that which is supreme in ourselves; and this is that which is
of like kind with that which is supreme in the universe (v. 21). So, as
Plotinus says, the soul of man can only know the divine so far as it
knows itself. In one passage (xi. 19) Antoninus speaks of a man's
condemnation of himself when t