ith
its various incidents, began to shock the philanthropic sentiments of
the more civilized races of mankind, while the question also began to be
raised whether slave-labour was not economically at a disadvantage, when
compared with free labour, and the result of these combined
considerations, often aided by a strong and enthusiastic outburst of
popular feeling, has been the total disappearance of slavery amongst
civilized, and its almost total disappearance even amongst barbaric or
semi-civilized races. Take, too, the revolting practice, common among
many savage tribes, past and present, of killing and eating aged parents
or other infirm members of the tribe, when engaged in war. This practice
which, at first sight, seems so utterly unnatural, was doubtless
dictated, in part at least, by the desire to save their victims from the
worse fate of being tortured and mutilated by their enemies.
Subsequently, in the history of some of these tribes, there has come a
time when it has been discovered that a more humane mode of attaining
the same object is to build strong places and leave the feebler folk at
home. If we follow the varying marriage customs of savage or barbaric
tribes, we shall find, in the same way, that they have always been
originally framed on reasons of convenience, and that, when they have
been changed, it has been because different views of well-being,
including the needs of purity, closer attachment, increased care of
children, and the like, have begun to prevail. In all these examples,
which might be multiplied to any extent, it is plain that changes of
conduct are moulded and determined by changes of opinion as to what is
best and most suitable for the circumstances of the individual, the
family, the tribe, or whatever the social aggregate may be. And I may
venture to affirm that, wherever any change of moral conduct takes
place, unless it be dictated by blind passion, or mere submission to
authority, enforced or voluntary, the change is invariably due to some
change of opinion on what constitutes the advantage of the persons whom
it affects. It is true, therefore, that moral conduct varies, and it is
true that our conceptions of well-being vary, but the two do not vary
independently of one another, or either of them capriciously. Increased
experience of ourselves and of others, enlarged observation of the
external world, more matured reflexion are constantly expanding and
rectifying our conceptions of w