ially and politically right,
though their tendency to that view has, in my opinion, been constant and
unmistakable for the past five years. I prefer to take, as the accepted
maxim of the party, the idea put forth by Judge Douglas, that he "don't
care whether slavery is voted down or voted up." I am quite willing to
believe that many Democrats would prefer that slavery should be always
voted down, and I know that some prefer that it be always voted up; but
I have a right to insist that their action, especially if it be their
constant action, shall determine their ideas and preferences on this
subject. Every measure of the Democratic party of late years, bearing
directly or indirectly on the slavery question, has corresponded with this
notion of utter indifference whether slavery or freedom shall outrun in
the race of empire across to the Pacific--every measure, I say, up to the
Dred Scott decision, where, it seems to me, the idea is boldly suggested
that slavery is better than freedom. The Republican party, on the
contrary, hold that this government was instituted to secure the blessings
of freedom, and that slavery is an unqualified evil to the negro, to the
white man, to the soil, and to the State. Regarding it as an evil, they
will not molest it in the States where it exists, they will not overlook
the constitutional guards which our fathers placed around it; they will
do nothing that can give proper offence to those who hold slaves by legal
sanction; but they will use every constitutional method to prevent the
evil from becoming larger and involving more negroes, more white men,
more soil, and more States in its deplorable consequences. They will, if
possible, place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it
is in course of ultimate peaceable extinction in God's own good time. And
to this end they will, if possible, restore the government to the policy
of the fathers, the policy of preserving the new Territories from the
baneful influence of human bondage, as the Northwestern Territories were
sought to be preserved by the Ordinance of 1787, and the Compromise Act
of 1820. They will oppose, in all its length and breadth, the modern
Democratic idea, that slavery is as good as freedom, and ought to have
room for expansion all over the continent, if people can be found to carry
it. All, or nearly all, of Judge Douglas's arguments are logical, if you
admit that slavery is as good and as right as freedom, and n