The Project Gutenberg EBook of Lysis, by Plato

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Title: Lysis

Author: Plato

Translator: Benjamin Jowett

Posting Date: August 24, 2008 [EBook #1579]
Release Date: December, 1998

Language: English

Character set encoding: ASCII

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Produced by Sue Asscher

LYSIS

By Plato

Translated by Benjamin Jowett

INTRODUCTION.

No answer is given in the Lysis to the question, 'What is Friendship?'
any more than in the Charmides to the question, 'What is Temperance?'
There are several resemblances in the two Dialogues: the same
youthfulness and sense of beauty pervades both of them; they are alike
rich in the description of Greek life. The question is again raised of
the relation of knowledge to virtue and good, which also recurs in the
Laches; and Socrates appears again as the elder friend of the two boys,
Lysis and Menexenus. In the Charmides, as also in the Laches, he is
described as middle-aged; in the Lysis he is advanced in years.

The Dialogue consists of two scenes or conversations which seem to have
no relation to each other. The first is a conversation between Socrates
and Lysis, who, like Charmides, is an Athenian youth of noble descent
and of great beauty, goodness, and intelligence: this is carried on
in the absence of Menexenus, who is called away to take part in a
sacrifice. Socrates asks Lysis whether his father and mother do not love
him very much? 'To be sure they do.' 'Then of course they allow him
to do exactly as he likes.' 'Of course not: the very slaves have more
liberty than he has.' 'But how is this?' 'The reason is that he is not
old enough.' 'No; the real reason is that he is not wise enough: for
are there not some things which he is allowed to do, although he is not
allowed to do others?' 'Yes, because he knows them, and does not know
the others.' This leads to the conclusion that all men everywhere will
trust him in what he knows, but not in what he does not know; for in
such matters he will be unprofitable to them, and do them no good. And
no one will love him, if he does them no good; and he can only do them
good by knowledge; and as he is still without knowled