ge, he can have as
yet no conceit of knowledge. In this manner Socrates reads a lesson
to Hippothales, the foolish lover of Lysis, respecting the style of
conversation which he should address to his beloved.

After the return of Menexenus, Socrates, at the request of Lysis, asks
him a new question: 'What is friendship? You, Menexenus, who have a
friend already, can tell me, who am always longing to find one, what is
the secret of this great blessing.'

When one man loves another, which is the friend--he who loves, or he who
is loved? Or are both friends? From the first of these suppositions they
are driven to the second; and from the second to the third; and neither
the two boys nor Socrates are satisfied with any of the three or with
all of them. Socrates turns to the poets, who affirm that God brings
like to like (Homer), and to philosophers (Empedocles), who also assert
that like is the friend of like. But the bad are not friends, for they
are not even like themselves, and still less are they like one another.
And the good have no need of one another, and therefore do not care
about one another. Moreover there are others who say that likeness is a
cause of aversion, and unlikeness of love and friendship; and they
too adduce the authority of poets and philosophers in support of their
doctrines; for Hesiod says that 'potter is jealous of potter, bard of
bard;' and subtle doctors tell us that 'moist is the friend of dry, hot
of cold,' and the like. But neither can their doctrine be maintained;
for then the just would be the friend of the unjust, good of evil.

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that like is not the friend of like,
nor unlike of unlike; and therefore good is not the friend of good, nor
evil of evil, nor good of evil, nor evil of good. What remains but that
the indifferent, which is neither good nor evil, should be the friend
(not of the indifferent, for that would be 'like the friend of like,'
but) of the good, or rather of the beautiful?

But why should the indifferent have this attachment to the beautiful or
good? There are circumstances under which such an attachment would be
natural. Suppose the indifferent, say the human body, to be desirous of
getting rid of some evil, such as disease, which is not essential but
only accidental to it (for if the evil were essential the body would
cease to be indifferent, and would become evil)--in such a case the
indifferent becomes a friend of the good for the sa