also for the sake of his son? I mean, for instance, if he knew
that his son had drunk hemlock, and the father thought that wine would
save him, he would value the wine?

He would.

And also the vessel which contains the wine?

Certainly.

But does he therefore value the three measures of wine, or the earthen
vessel which contains them, equally with his son? Is not this rather
the true state of the case? All his anxiety has regard not to the means
which are provided for the sake of an object, but to the object for the
sake of which they are provided. And although we may often say that gold
and silver are highly valued by us, that is not the truth; for there is
a further object, whatever it may be, which we value most of all, and
for the sake of which gold and all our other possessions are acquired by
us. Am I not right?

Yes, certainly.

And may not the same be said of the friend? That which is only dear to
us for the sake of something else is improperly said to be dear, but
the truly dear is that in which all these so-called dear friendships
terminate.

That, he said, appears to be true.

And the truly dear or ultimate principle of friendship is not for the
sake of any other or further dear.

True.

Then we have done with the notion that friendship has any further
object. May we then infer that the good is the friend?

I think so.

And the good is loved for the sake of the evil? Let me put the case in
this way: Suppose that of the three principles, good, evil, and that
which is neither good nor evil, there remained only the good and the
neutral, and that evil went far away, and in no way affected soul or
body, nor ever at all that class of things which, as we say, are neither
good nor evil in themselves;--would the good be of any use, or other
than useless to us? For if there were nothing to hurt us any longer,
we should have no need of anything that would do us good. Then would
be clearly seen that we did but love and desire the good because of the
evil, and as the remedy of the evil, which was the disease; but if there
had been no disease, there would have been no need of a remedy. Is not
this the nature of the good--to be loved by us who are placed between
the two, because of the evil? but there is no use in the good for its
own sake.

I suppose not.

Then the final principle of friendship, in which all other friendships
terminated, those, I mean, which are relatively dear and for the sake of
som