sacrifice were not furnished."
The reply was an admission of the fact. The reason alleged was, "For
the river rose on a sudden, and on that account it was impossible to
convey them across." The argument used to invalidate that reason
was, "Nevertheless, since what the law enjoins was not done, you are
deserving of punishment." The question for the decision of the judges
was, "Whether, as in that respect the contractor did not comply with
the law, being prevented by the unexpected rise of the river
which hindered his giving effect to his zeal, he is deserving of
punishment."

XXXII. But the plea of necessity is introduced when the accused person
is defended as having done what he is accused of having done under
the influence of compulsion. In this way:--"There is a law among the
Rhodians, that if any vessel with a beak is caught in their harbour,
it shall be confiscated. There was a violent storm at sea; the
violence of the winds compelled a vessel, against the will of her
crew, to take refuge in the harbour of the Rhodians. On this the
quaestor claims the vessel for the people. The captain of the ship
declared that it was not just that it should be confiscated." The
charge is, "A ship with a beak was caught in the harbour." The reply
is an admission of the fact. The reason given is, "We were driven
into the harbour by violence and necessity." The argument brought to
invalidate that reason is, "Nevertheless, according to the law that
ship ought to become the property of the people." The question for the
decision of the judge is, "Whether, as the law confiscates every ship
with a beak which is found in the harbour, and as this ship, in spite
of the endeavours of her crew, was driven into the harbour by the
violence of the tempest, it ought to be confiscated."

We have collected these examples of these three kinds of cases into
one place, because a similar rule for the arguments required for these
prevails in all of them. For in all of them, in the first place, it
is desirable, if the case itself affords any opportunity of doing so,
that a conjecture should be introduced by the accuser, in order that
that which it will be stated was not done intentionally, may be
demonstrated by some suspicious circumstances, to have been done
intentionally. In the next place, it will be well to introduce a
definition of necessity, or of accident, or of ignorance, and to add
instances to that definition, in which ignorance, or accident,