supposes a covenant, or mutual
engagements between God and men? If God owes nothing to his creatures,
they, on their part, can owe nothing to their God. All religion is founded
upon the happiness that men think they have a right to expect from the
Deity, who is supposed to say to them: _Love me, adore me, obey me: and I
will make you happy_. Men, on their part, say to him: _Make us happy, be
faithful to your promises, and we will love you, we will adore you,
and obey your laws_. By neglecting the happiness of his creatures,
distributing his favours according to his caprice, and retracting his
gifts, does not God break the covenant, which serves as the basis of all
religion? Cicero has justly observed, that _if God is not agreeable to
man, he cannot be his God_. Goodness constitutes deity; this goodness can
be manifested to man only by the blessings he enjoys; as soon as he is
unhappy, this goodness disappears, and with it the divinity. An infinite
goodness can be neither limited, partial, nor exclusive. If God be
infinitely good, he owes happiness to all his creatures. The unhappiness
of a single being would suffice to annihilate unbounded goodness. Under an
infinitely good and powerful God, is it possible to conceive that a single
man should suffer? One animal, or mite, that suffers, furnishes invincible
arguments against divine providence and its infinite goodness.

61.

According to theology, the afflictions and evils of this life are
chastisements, which guilty men incur from the hand of God. But why are
men guilty? If God is omnipotent, does it cost him more to say: "Let every
thing in the world be in order; let all my subjects be good, innocent, and
fortunate," than to say: "Let every thing exist"? Was it more difficult
for this God to do his work well, than badly? Religion tells us of a
hell; that is, a frightful abode, where, notwithstanding his goodness,
God reserves infinite torments for the majority of men. Thus after having
rendered mortals very unhappy in this world, religion tells them, that God
can render them still more unhappy in another! The theologian gets over
this, by saying, that the goodness of God will then give place to his
justice. But a goodness, which gives place to the most terrible cruelty,
is not an infinite goodness. Besides, can a God, who, after having been
infinitely good, becomes infinitely bad, be regarded as an immutable
being? Can we discern the shadow of clemency or goodnes