d would punish him for not giving him grace, without which
he could not possibly do better.
80.
Theologians repeatedly tell us, that man is free, while all their
principles conspire to destroy his liberty. By endeavouring to justify
the Divinity, they in reality accuse him of the blackest injustice. They
suppose, that without grace, man is necessitated to do evil. They affirm,
that God will punish him, because God has not given him grace to do good!
Little reflection will suffice to convince us, that man is necessitated
in all his actions, that his free will is a chimera, even in the system of
theologians. Does it depend upon man to be born of such or such parents?
Does it depend upon man to imbibe or not to imbibe the opinions of his
parents or instructors? If I had been born of idolatrous or Mahometan
parents, would it have depended upon me to become a Christian? Yet,
divines gravely assure us, that a just God will damn without pity all
those, to whom he has not given grace to know the Christian religion!
Man's birth is wholly independent of his choice. He is not asked whether
he is willing, or not, to come into the world. Nature does not consult
him upon the country and parents she gives him. His acquired ideas, his
opinions, his notions true or false, are necessary fruits of the education
which he has received, and of which he has not been the director. His
passions and desires are necessary consequences of the temperament given
him by nature. During his whole life, his volitions and actions are
determined by his connections, habits, occupations, pleasures, and
conversations; by the thoughts, that are involuntarily presented to his
mind; in a word, by a multitude of events and accidents, which it is out
of his power to foresee or prevent. Incapable of looking into futurity,
he knows not what he will do. From the instant of his birth to that of
his death, he is never free. You will say, that he wills, deliberates,
chooses, determines; and you will hence conclude, that his actions are
free. It is true, that man wills, but he is not master of his will or
his desires; he can desire and will only what he judges advantageous to
himself; he can neither love pain, nor detest pleasure. It will be
said, that he sometimes prefers pain to pleasure; but then he prefers
a momentary pain with a view of procuring a greater and more durable
pleasure. In this case, the prospect of a greater good necessarily
determines hi
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