m to forego a less considerable good.
The lover does not give his mistress the features which captivate him; he
is not then master of loving, or not loving the object of his tenderness;
he is not master of his imagination or temperament. Whence it evidently
follows, that man is not master of his volitions and desires. "But man,"
you will say, "can resist his desires; therefore he is free." Man resists
his desires, when the motives, which divert him from an object, are
stronger than those, which incline him towards it; but then his resistance
is necessary. A man, whose fear of dishonour or punishment is greater than
his love of money, necessarily resists the desire of stealing.
"Are we not free, when we deliberate?" But, are we masters of knowing or
not knowing, of being in doubt or certainty? Deliberation is a necessary
effect of our uncertainty respecting the consequences of our actions. When
we are sure, or think we are sure, of these consequences, we necessarily
decide, and we then act necessarily according to our true or false
judgment. Our judgments, true or false, are not free; they are necessarily
determined by the ideas, we have received, or which our minds have formed.
Man is not free in his choice; he is evidently necessitated to choose what
he judges most useful and agreeable. Neither is he free, when he suspends
his choice; he is forced to suspend it until he knows, or thinks he knows,
the qualities of the objects presented to him, or, until he has weighed
the consequences of his actions. "Man," you will say, "often decides in
favour of actions, which he knows must be detrimental to himself; man
sometimes kills himself; therefore he is free." I deny it. Is man master
of reasoning well or ill? Do not his reason and wisdom depend upon the
opinions he has formed, or upon the conformation of his machine? As
neither one nor the other depends upon his will, they are no proof of
liberty. "If I lay a wager, that I shall do, or not do a thing, am I
not free? Does it not depend upon me to do it or not?" No, I answer; the
desire of winning the wager will necessarily determine you to do, or not
to do the thing in question. "But, supposing I consent to lose the wager?"
Then the desire of proving to me, that you are free, will have become a
stronger motive than the desire of winning the wager; and this motive
will have necessarily determined you to do, or not to do, the thing in
question.
"But," you will say, "I fee
|