his commodity, he will become absolute master
of those who receive him for their guide; he is sure of becoming the
object of their attention, respect, and veneration. Such are the true
motives, which kindle the zeal and charity of so many preachers and
missionaries.

To die for an opinion, proves the truth or goodness of that opinion
no more than to die in battle proves the justice of a cause, in which
thousands have the folly to devote their lives. The courage of a martyr,
elated with the idea of paradise, is not more supernatural, than the
courage of a soldier, intoxicated with the idea of glory, or impelled
by the fear of disgrace. What is the difference between an Iroquois, who
sings while he is burning by inches, and the martyr ST. LAURENCE, who upon
the gridiron insults his tyrant?

The preachers of a new doctrine fail, because they are the weakest;
apostles generally practise a perilous trade. Their courageous death
proves neither the truth of their principles nor their own sincerity,
any more than the violent death of the ambitious man, or of the robber,
proves, that they were right in disturbing society, or that they thought
themselves authorised in so doing. The trade of a missionary was always
flattering to ambition, and formed a convenient method of living at the
expense of the vulgar. These advantages have often been enough to efface
every idea of danger.

134.

You tell us, theologians! that _what is folly in the eyes of men, is
wisdom before God, who delights to confound the wisdom of the wise_. But
do you not say, that human wisdom is a gift of heaven? In saying this
wisdom displeases God, is but folly in his sight, and that he is pleased
to confound it, you declare that your God is the friend only of ignorant
people, and that he makes sensible people a fatal present for which this
perfidious tyrant promises to punish them cruelly at some future day. Is
it not strange, that one can be the friend of your God, only by declaring
one's self the enemy of reason and good sense?

135.

According to the divines, _faith is an assent without evidence_. Whence it
follows, that religion requires us firmly to believe inevident things, and
propositions often improbable or contrary to reason. But when we reject
reason as a judge of faith, do we not confess, that reason is incompatible
with faith? As the ministers of religion have resolved to banish reason,
they must have felt the impossibility of re