t wish
to do or to hear. It is their action solely, and we have no more part in
it than if we were brute beasts, or inanimate objects. It is, then, the
intention that gives character to the action.

That we commonly do what we intend to do there can be no doubt. We do not
act under _immediate_ compulsion. We are, therefore, free _agents_, or
actors. But are our intentions free? Is it in our power to will otherwise
than we will? When we choose to perform an act that is just or kind, is it
in our power to choose to perform an act of the opposite character? In
other words, is the _will_ free? If it be not so, then what we call our
intentions are not ours, but are to be attributed to the superior will
which has given direction to our wills. If God has so arranged the order
of nature and the course of events as to force my will in certain
directions, good or evil, then it is He that does the good or evil which I
seem to do. On this supposition God is the only agent or actor in the
universe. Evil, if it be wrought, is wrought by Him alone; and if we
cannot admit that the Supreme Being does evil, the only alternative is to
deny the existence of evil, and to maintain that what we call evil bears
an essential part in the production of good. For instance, if the horrible
enormities imputed to Nero were utterly bad, the evil that was in them is
chargeable, not on Nero, but on God; or if it be maintained that God
cannot do evil, then Nero was an instrument for the advancement of human
happiness and well-being.

What reasons have we for believing that the human will is free?

1. We have the direct evidence of consciousness. We are distinctly
conscious, not only of doing as we choose, but of exercising our free
choice among different objects of desire, between immediate and future
enjoyment, between good and evil. Now, though consciousness may sometimes
deceive us, it is the strongest evidence that we can have; we are so
constituted that we cannot refuse our credence to it; and our belief in it
lies at the basis of all evidence and of all knowledge.

2. We are clearly conscious of merit or demerit, of self-approval or
self-condemnation, in consequence of our actions. If our wills were acted
upon by a force beyond our control, we might congratulate or pity
ourselves, but we could not praise or blame ourselves, for what we had
done.

3. We praise or blame others for their good or evil actions; and in our
conduct toward them we sho