has not rights that should be respected,
none who is not entitled to pity for his sufferings, and, still more, for
his sins.

* * * * *

The affections, benevolent and malevolent, are common to man with lower
animals. Love and hatred are manifested by all of them whose habits are
open to our inspection; anger, by not a few; gratitude, kindness, pity,
sympathy, resentment, and revenge, by the more intelligent; envy, by those
most completely domesticated; reverence, perhaps, by the dog towards his
master.

The affections all prompt to action, and do not discriminate the qualities
of actions. Hence they need the control and guidance of reason, and can
safely be indulged only in accordance with the principles which reason
recognizes as supreme in the conduct of life.

Chapter III.

THE GOVERNING PRINCIPLES OF ACTION.

The appetites, desires, and affections constitute the *impelling force* in
all action. Were we not possessed of them, we should not act. There is no
act of any kind, good or bad, noble or base, mental or bodily, of which
one or another of them is not the proximate cause. They are also
imperative in their demands. They crave immediate action,--the appetites,
in procuring or using the means of bodily gratification; the desires, in
the increase of their objects; the affections, in seeking or bestowing
their appropriate tokens or expressions, whether good or evil. Were there
no check, the specific appetite, desire, or affection to which
circumstances gave the ascendency for the time being, would act in its
appropriate direction, until counteracted by another, brought into
supremacy by a new series of circumstances. This is the case with brutes,
so far as we can observe their modes of action. Here, in man, reason
intervenes, and takes cognizance of the tendencies and the qualities of
actions.

*Reason* considers actions under two points of view,--interest and
obligation,--expediency and right. The questions which we inwardly ask
concerning actions all resolve themselves into one of these,--Is the act
useful or desirable for me? or, Is it my right or my duty? He who is wont
to ask the former of these questions is called a prudent man; he who
habitually asks the latter is termed a virtuous or good man. He who asks
neither of them yields himself, after the manner of the brutes, to the
promptings of appetite, desire, and affection, and t