ly
more numerous and complicated than those involved in our own well-being;
and, if not appetite or desire, the benevolent or malevolent affections
are fully as apt to warp our judgment and to misdirect our conduct in the
case of others as in our own case.

We perceive then that *expediency*, whether with reference to ourselves or
to others, *is not a trustworthy rule of conduct*. Yet while it cannot
hold the first place, it occupies an important place; for there are many
cases in which the question before us is not what we ought to do, but what
it is best for us to do. Thus, if there be several acts, all equally
right, only one of which can be performed, we are evidently entitled to
perform the act which will be most pleasing or useful to ourselves. If
there be an end which it is our right or duty to attain, and there be
several equally innocent modes of attaining it, the question for us is, by
which of these modes we may find the least difficulty or gain the highest
enjoyment or advantage. If there be several duties incumbent upon us at
the same time and place, all of which have equal intrinsic claims, yet one
of which must necessarily take precedence of the rest, the question which
shall have precedence is a question of expediency, that by which we may do
the most good being the foremost duty.

*Expediency is not a characteristic of actions.* An act is not in itself
expedient or inexpedient, but is made one or the other by varying
circumstances alone; while there are acts in themselves good which no
possible circumstances could make bad, and there are acts in themselves
bad which no possible circumstances could make good. If, therefore, there
be a science which has for its province the intrinsic qualities of
actions, questions of expediency have no place in such a science.

*Moral Philosophy, or Ethics* (synonymous terms), is the science which
treats of human actions. The term _morals_ is often applied to external
actions; but always with reference to the intentions from which they
proceed. We can conceive of the treatment of actions under various
aspects, as wise or unwise, agreeable or disagreeable, spontaneous or
deliberate; but by the common consent of mankind, at least of the
civilized and enlightened portion of mankind, the distinction of actions
as right or wrong is regarded as of an importance so far transcending all
other distinctions, as to render them of comparatively little moment.
Therefore Moral Philo