rs of minority, but so
long as he remains a member of his parent's family, or dependent on him
for subsistence. Subsequently, it is undoubtedly his duty to consult the
reasonable wishes of his parent, to hold him in respect and reverence, to
minister assiduously to his comfort and happiness, and, if need be, to
sustain him in his years of decline and infirmity.

Section III.

Veracity.

*The duty of veracity* is not contingent on the rights of any second
person, but is derived from considerations of intrinsic fitness. If
representations of facts, truths, or opinions are to be made, it is
obviously fitting and right that they should be conformed to one's
knowledge or belief; and no one can make representations which he knows to
be false without the consciousness of unfitness and wrong.

*The most important interests of society depend on the confidence which
men repose in one another's veracity.* But for this, history would be
worth no more than fiction, and its lessons would be unheeded. But for
this, judicial proceedings would be a senseless mockery of justice, and
the administration of law and equity, the merest haphazard. But for this,
the common intercourse of life would be invaded by incessant doubt and
suspicion, and its daily transactions, aimless and tentative. Against this
condition of things man is defended by his own nature. It is more natural
to tell the truth than to utter falsehood. The very persons who are the
least scrupulous in this matter utter the truth when they have no motive
to do otherwise. Spontaneous falsehood betokens insanity.

*The essence of falsehood lies in the intention to deceive*, not in the
words uttered. The words may bear a double sense; and while one of the
meanings may be true, the circumstances or the manner of utterance may be
such as inevitably to impose the false meaning upon the hearer. A part of
the truth may be told in such a way as to convey an altogether false
impression. A fact may be stated with the express purpose of misleading
the hearer with regard to another fact. Looks or gestures may be framed
with the intent to communicate or confirm a falsehood. Silent acquiescence
in a known falsehood may be no less criminal than its direct utterance.

*But has not one a right to conceal facts which another has no right to
know?* In such a case, concealment is undoubtedly a right; but falsehood,
or equivocation, or truth which will co