t and happiness, and the accumulation of
those large fortunes which are invaluable as safety-funds and
movement-funds for the whole community.

There are cases in which there is manifestly a *conflict of duties*. This
most frequently occurs between prudence and beneficence. Up to a certain
point they coincide. No prudent man will suffer himself to contract
unsocial, or selfish, or miserly habits, or to neglect the ordinary good
offices and common charities of life. But is one bound to transcend the
limits of prudence, and, without any specific grounds of personal
obligation, to incur loss, hardship, or peril, in behalf of another
person? One is no doubt bound to do all that he could reasonably expect
from another, were their positions reversed; but is it his duty to do more
than this? In answer, it must be admitted that he who in such a case
suffers prudence to limit his beneficence has done all that duty
absolutely requires; but, in proportion to the warmth of his benevolence
and the loftiness of his spirit and character, he will find himself
constrained to transcend this limit, and to sacrifice prudence to
beneficence. Thus--to take an instance from a class of events by no means
infrequent--if I see a man in danger of drowning, it is obviously my duty
to do all that I can do for his rescue without putting my own life in
jeopardy. But I owe him no more than this. My own life is precious to me
and to my family, and I have a right so to regard it. I shall not deserve
censure or self-reproach, if I decline exposing myself to imminent peril.
Yet if I have the generosity and the courage which belong to a truly noble
nature, I shall not content myself with doing no more than this,--I shall
hazard my own safety if there is reason to hope that my efforts may have a
successful issue; and in so doing I shall perform an act of heroic virtue.
The same principle will apply to exposure, danger, and sacrifice of every
kind, incurred for the safety, relief, or benefit of others. We transgress
no positive law of right, when we omit doing for others more than we could
rightfully expect were we in their place. Prudence in such a case is our
right. But it is a right which it is more noble to surrender than to
retain; and the readiness with which and the degree in which we are
willing to surrender it, may be taken as a fair criterion of our moral
growth and strength.

Under the title of *Justice*, with the broad scope which we have given t